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ABSTRACT: This paper will have two parts. In the first, it will point out the agreement between 
lists of paradigm epistemic and argumentative virtues, and it will take that agreement as prima facie 
support for the epistemic approach to argument evaluation. Second, it will consider the disagreement 
over whether successful argument resolution requires change of belief or whether it only requires 
change of commitment. It turns out that the epistemic approach is neutral on that question. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
What is a virtue of argumentation, and how can we bring the notion of a virtue of 
argumentation to bear on questions of argument construction, reconstruction, 
delivery, analysis, evaluation, and so on? That, I take it, is the theme of this 
conference. In this paper, my approach will be to approach virtues of argumentation 
through the lens of virtue epistemology.  
 I want to begin with an explanation, of sorts. This paper is an instance of an 
unfortunate tendency of mine that happens with an undeniable frequency: I set out 
to write one paper, and I end up writing quite a different paper from what I had 
intended. (I console myself that even very good philosophers do this on occasion.) 
For this paper, as the abstract indicates, I had intended to argue in support of an 
epistemic approach to the theory of argument, by compiling and comparing lists of 
paradigmatic epistemic or intellectual virtues, on the one hand, and paradigmatic 
virtues of argumentation, on the other.  
But, of course, there aren’t any definitive or widely agreed-upon lists of 
virtues of argumentation,1 so it’s not possible to simply compile lists of paradigmatic 
argumentative virtues from extant literature on the subject. My plan was therefore 
to provide a criterion of virtues of argumentation, which would be analogous to the 
                                                 
1 There is a good initial list of virtues of argumentation in (Aberdein, 2010, p. 175), but it’s not 
intended as an exhaustive or a definitive list, and there aren’t any attempts at definitive lists that I am 
aware of. 
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rough criterion of virtues in epistemology. An epistemic virtue, we might say, is a 
stable disposition in a person’s cognitive makeup, which promotes intellectual 
flourishing, or which promotes the achievement of what is epistemically valuable, 
where what is epistemically valuable is usually taken to be to believe the truth and 
to avoid error.  
An analogous criterion, for virtues of argumentation, would be that virtues of 
argumentation are stable dispositions in people, which promote the achievement of 
what is valuable in arguments. On the basis of this kind of criterion, I had intended 
to compile my list of virtues of argumentation, and then to note that the list I had 
compiled looks very much like a subset of the epistemic or intellectual virtues. So, I 
had planned to conclude, insofar as it is plausible to make use of epistemic virtues in 
doing epistemology, and the virtues of argumentation are a subset of epistemic 
virtues, it makes good sense to do the theory of argument from an epistemic 
perspective. 
 But the problem with that strategy, I came to realize, was that in providing a 
criterion of virtues of argumentation, I would be appealing to what is valuable in 
argumentation. And, of course, there isn’t any widespread agreement about what is 
valuable in argumentation. There are all sorts of views about what a good argument 
aims to achieve or promote – for example, to get issues on the table, or to arrive at 
true belief, or to achieve rational persuasion, or to rationally resolve disputes. Some 
theorists think that there is no particular thing that arguments ought to achieve.2 
 So in proposing a criterion of virtues of argumentation, in terms of the 
promotion of the good of argumentation, for the purpose of generating a list of 
virtues of argumentation that would be mostly a subset of the epistemic virtues – in 
order to argue ultimately in favour of an epistemic approach to the theory of 
argument – I would have to beg the question, and presuppose that the good of 
argumentation is an epistemic sort of good. Otherwise, the criterion of good 
argumentation will not likely generate the kind of list of virtues that I am looking 
for. 
 I don’t want to beg the question in that way, and so I have given up the 
project in that form. But I am still interested in trying to apply epistemic virtues to 
the domain of argumentation. What I will do in this paper, then, is take it for granted 
that the epistemic approach to the theory of argument is reasonable. I will not 
assume that it is categorically the best approach, but it is a worthwhile approach, 
and that is what I will be working with.  
Moreover, if we are interested in a virtue-style theory of argument, it makes 
good sense to come at this idea from an epistemic point of view. The only alternative 
would be to take an ethical approach to the study of argumentation, which just 
seems unmotivated (since most of ethical virtues other than the epistemic ones do 
not themselves typically bear directly on argumentation). Or at best, that approach 
would be radically incomplete. If anything, some ethical virtues can make for poor 
argumentation (e.g. righteous anger can make for poor argumentation, even if it is 
                                                 
2 See Johnson (2000), Biro & Siegel (2006), Goodwin (2007), Blair (2004), and van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst (2004) for a variety of views about whether there is a purpose of arguments, and if so, 
what that purpose is. 
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how the virtuous ethical agent would react to some sorts of situation). What this 
means is that perhaps it is not always ethically best to strive for good 
argumentation.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I set out some of 
the basics of the virtue approach in epistemology. I also explain one view within 
virtue epistemology which I am particularly keen on avoiding: the view that the 
primary bearers of justification are the epistemic virtues, while beliefs get their 
justification in a secondary manner, by being produced by epistemic virtues. 
In part 4, I apply the virtue epistemology framework to the theory of 
argument. I propose a criterion of good arguments and of virtues of argumentation, 
and I show that that criterion can account for what appear to be clear virtues of 
argumentation. In part 5, I answer the objection that, because the virtues of 
argumentation are not primary tools of the theory of argument, on my view – they 
derive their goodness from the fact that they promote good arguments, not the 
other way around – it follows that the virtues are unnecessary for the theory of 
argument. Finally, in section 6, I sketch out how we might discuss two of the 
traditional fallacies in terms of the virtues, as an illustration of the usefulness of 
theorizing in terms of the virtues. The first fallacy, following Aberdein, is the ad 
hominem; the second is the tu quoque. 
 
2. VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Epistemology generally is the study of knowledge, justified beliefs, proper belief-
forming practices, and the like. To take the epistemic approach to the theory of 
argument is to approach argumentation as a practice in which people are putting 
forward reasons that are intended to justify the belief in or acceptance of their 
conclusions, and to assess the quality of argumentation based on how well it 
conduces to achieving that goal. 
 Now there are two basic ways that epistemologists have tended to think of 
the epistemic virtues, dividing into roughly two sorts of view: there are virtue 
responsibilists (e.g. Code, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996; Montmarquet, 1993), and virtue 
reliabilists (e.g. Goldman, 1992; Sosa, 2003). Both types of virtue theorist focus on 
mental traits and dispositions which promote the achievement of healthy cognitive 
lives, and a cognitive life is healthy largely in virtue of whether the agent has mostly 
true beliefs (or is disposed to have mostly true beliefs). A healthy cognitive life is 
also part of a healthy life overall; it is an integrated part of a healthy and well-
functioning person. So a healthy cognitive life is also a matter of whether the agent 
has many true beliefs – merely having a high ratio of true to false beliefs isn’t enough 
to guarantee a healthy cognitive life, since a skeptic who only believes in her own 
existence, and suspends judgment on everything else, would have one true belief 
and no false beliefs, which is a perfect ratio, but that doesn’t strike us as a healthy 
cognitive life. (Of course, a skeptic would say that the healthiest cognitive life is one 
where you have all of the true beliefs that are rational to believe, and no false ones, 
and that there’s nothing that is rational to believe in other than one’s own existence. 
So it is perhaps controversial to rule out the skeptic’s position as an unhealthy way 
of conducting one’s cognitive life. But most of us are not in fact skeptics, so it’s at 
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least a fair, if defeasible, starting-point from which to begin the discussion of 
epistemic virtues.) 
Similarly, a healthy cognitive life usually involves having many true beliefs 
about a broad range of subjects: a person who has an obsession to learn many things 
about one narrow subject matter, to the detriment of his other life projects, does not 
have a healthy cognitive life. (Think of the Nutty Professor, who was so obsessed 
with his Flubber that he forgot about his own wedding.) 
 We can bear all of that in mind, though, without making it the focus of the 
discussion of epistemic virtues. It is the background against which most of our 
belief-formation occurs. Most people are, after all, interested in a wide range of 
things, particularly those things that are important for achieving their important life 
projects. And again, people typically are not skeptics; they do as a matter of fact 
have many beliefs. So the primary focus, at least, in a discussion of epistemic virtues, 
is going to be on whether people’s cognitive traits are conducive to achieving mostly 
true beliefs, i.e. whether they are conducive to having a good true-to-false belief-
ratio. 
 Now a virtue responsibilist will say that cognitive traits are virtuous if they 
are responsible ways of forming beliefs: they involve responsible collection of 
evidence, and responsible evaluation of beliefs in light of the evidence, and 
responsible consideration of the views of experts, and so on. This is a very internalist 
sort of approach to the epistemic virtues, where the focus is on the deliberative 
aspect of our cognitive lives: it is about doing the best we can to acquire true beliefs 
about important matters. 
 Virtue reliabilists, by contrast, require that our cognitive traits are in fact 
reliable at getting us true beliefs and avoiding false ones, in order for those traits to 
count as virtuous. Sense-perception, for example, is a paradigmatic reliabilist virtue, 
because it is in fact widely recognized to be typically a reliable source of true beliefs, 
when used in appropriate conditions.  
 Of course there is a good deal of overlap between the two ways of thinking of 
the virtues: responsible cognitive practices and dispositions will typically be 
reliable, and it will typically be responsible to form beliefs according to reliable 
cognitive dispositions. The difference is in the focus of the theories, and on the 
relevant concepts that need to be spelled out and defended. The approach to 
epistemic virtues in terms of their reliability has to spell out the notion of reliability, 
and it has to have something to say about the generality problem which threatens 
ordinary (non-virtue) reliabilist approaches to epistemic justification. 
Responsibilists have to have something to say about what makes a cognitive trait 
responsible in the first place. 
 
3. HOW NOT TO DO VIRTUE THEORY 
 
I do not want to endorse the virtue approach to epistemology or ethics wholesale. In 
ethics, virtues are stable dispositions to choose or act well – but people can do 
things that are morally right, even if they do not have any such stable dispositions. 
(An evil person can on occasion choose to do what is right; his evil tendencies do not 
prevent his occasional good actions from being good.) Similarly, regarding epistemic 
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virtues, a person who is highly prone to denying evidence that is contrary to her 
views may on occasion take contrary evidence into account. And in those cases, she 
might achieve a justified belief, even though it hasn’t resulted from a stable 
disposition to form beliefs on the basis of a careful consideration of all of the 
available evidence.3 
 What I want to deny, then, is the view (typical of virtue theorists) that it is 
agents and/or their virtues that are primarily epistemically justified (in 
epistemology) or primarily morally good (in ethics), while their beliefs or actions are 
only epistemically justified, or morally good, in a secondary fashion, by virtue of 
being the result of the epistemic or ethical virtues. Beliefs can be epistemically 
justified just because they are formed responsibly, in the light of appropriate 
evidence, even if the agent in question is not a virtuous epistemic agent.  
 Nevertheless, there is fruitful work to be done in epistemology, in terms of 
the epistemic virtues. The mere fact that they are not the primary bearers of 
justification does not make them useless for epistemic theorizing and pedagogy. 
Even though they are neither the primary tool of epistemology nor of fundamental 
epistemic value, they are both interesting and important, insofar as they promote 
the achievement of what is of fundamental epistemic value. Similarly, in ethics, the 
primary unit of moral evaluation is particular actions, not virtues of character. But 
being a virtuous person makes it more likely that you will do good actions, since the 
virtues just are dispositions to choose and act well. So of course we should try to be 
virtuous people, even though the goodness of the ethical virtues is parasitic on the 
goodness of particular good actions. 
 
4. VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND ARGUMENTATION 
 
With those basics of virtue epistemology in mind, and with that proviso about how 
not to do virtue theory in mind, we can move on to developing the epistemic virtue 
approach to argumentation. It makes the most sense to me to think of virtues of 
argumentation as responsibilist sorts of virtues, since argumentation is precisely the 
sort of thing that we engage in when we are trying to provide rational justifications 
for beliefs – we are trying to achieve a reflective basis which responsible agents 
would employ as a basis for their beliefs. A responsible agent would form a belief on 
the basis of good, reflectively available reasons – and in an argument, of course, the 
reasons for and against a belief are as reflectively accessible as they can be. 
 Now, in thinking about what makes for a good argument, it is important to 
bear in mind the familiar point that there can be good arguments for false 
conclusions. This means that soundness is not a good criterion of good 
argumentation. Neither is Aberdein’s proposal that good arguments “propagate 
truth”; for Aberdein, virtuous arguers “are disposed to spread truth around” (2010, 
p. 173). But we need to be careful: because there can be very good arguments for 
false conclusions, it follows that even though the truth is what we are striving for, 
                                                 
3 Brogaard (forthcoming) argues, similarly, that because cognitive success can occur even in the 
absence of the exercise of intellectual virtues, traditional reliabilism in epistemology is superior to 
both of the main strains of virtue epistemology. 
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good arguments can spread around falsehoods too. So the propagation of truth as a 
criterion of good arguments is on the right track, but it needs to be qualified so that 
it allows good arguments for false conclusions. 
 It seems to me that the following is an appropriate general criterion of 
virtues of argumentation: virtues of argumentation are dispositions to engage in 
argumentation in a responsible manner, where responsible engagement in 
argumentation involves accepting the conclusion on the basis of the premises, when 
(and only when) the premises give the arguers a good reason for thinking that the 
conclusion is true.4 Virtuous arguers will be disposed to spread around good 
reasons for thinking that propositions are true. They will also be disposed to 
provide criticisms of arguments, when the argument at hand does not appear to 
provide good reasons for accepting its conclusion. This characterization of the goal 
of argumentation, and of the dispositions characteristic of virtuous arguers, is 
consistent with the fact that we can have good reasons for accepting false 
conclusions. 
 Now, that is only a rough criterion of good arguments and virtuous arguers; 
it doesn’t tell us what the virtues of argumentation are, and the notion of 
responsibility is not very precise. Still, there is an ordinary understanding of 
responsibility, which is good enough for our purpose right now. And it does seem 
that this criterion of the virtues of argumentation can capture many of what appear 
to be clear cases of virtues of argumentation which Aberdein identifies (2010, p. 
175).  
Consider just a few examples of what are plausible to take as virtues of 
argumentation: being communicative, i.e. being willing to share one’s reasons for 
holding a belief, or for questioning a proposition, etc., is what a responsible agent 
would do when trying to arrive at a justified belief in the truth of a proposition, on 
the basis of an argument. A responsible agent would not keep her thoughts to 
herself, for (1) then the other participants in the argumentative exchange will not 
have the benefit of the agent’s reasons, and (2) the agent herself will not have the 
benefit of the critical reactions that other participants in the exchange might offer. 
Sensitivity to detail is another apparent virtue, which is clearly important for 
responsible engagement in argumentation, because details which can appear small 
and unimportant sometimes make a big difference in whether a set of premises 
makes a conclusion likely to be true. Suppose, for example, that we are trying to 
provide an inductive argument that most members of some population P have a 
characteristic C. And suppose that there are two kinds of Ps, which are the same in 
all but a few respects, and so for most purposes we can treat them the same way. 
But suppose that C is one of the few characteristics where the two kinds of Ps differ. 
In such a case, if we are not sensitive to details, we might gloss over the difference 
between the two kinds of Ps, and draw our inductive inference based on an 
unrepresentative sample of the population of Ps. 
The criterion of virtues of argument I’ve proposed, then, of responsibly 
engaging with arguments, which involves accepting the conclusion when and only 
                                                 
4 Or, if the agents already believe that the conclusion is true, then the aim would only be to provide 
further justification for the belief. 
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when the premises provide good reason for thinking that the conclusion is true, can 
account for the virtuousness of being communicative and sensitivity to detail. 
Similarly, I think that it is clear that that criterion captures other apparent virtues of 
argumentation, such as recognition of reliable authority, care, and thoroughness. 
 But again, as I have argued regarding epistemology and ethics, the basic unit 
that comes up for evaluation in argumentation ought to be particular arguments, not 
the virtues of argumentation. Virtues of argumentation are virtues, because they 
promote good argumentation; good argumentation is not good in virtue of being 
carried out by virtuous arguers. Bad arguers can make good arguments, and can 
engage responsibly with arguments put forward by others.  
 
5. ANYTHING WE CAN SAY IN TERMS OF VIRTUES, WE CAN SAY WITHOUT THEM! 
 
I anticipate the following objection: “if you do not think that the primary unit that 
comes up for evaluation in epistemology is the epistemic agent (or the epistemic 
virtues), or in ethics, the ethical agent (or the ethical virtues), then you do not get to 
call yourself a real virtue theorist.” I accept this objection; I am not overly concerned 
with the label “real virtue theorist.” But as I said in section 3, there is still useful 
work to be done in terms of the virtues, even if they are not the basic elements of a 
good approach to the theory of argument. 
 “But if you do not think that the virtues are a basic tool of argumentation 
theory, then presumably, anything that you can say in terms of the virtues, you can 
say without them too. So they’re superfluous.” I accept this objection as well. But 
just because they are strictly speaking superfluous, it does not follow that they are 
useless. Consider, by analogy, Kant’s ethical system: everything comes down to the 
Categorical Imperative (CI), for Kant. Any ethical claim you make can be brought 
back to that ultimate principle. But that doesn’t mean that every time we are 
considering what to do, we have to slam down the CI. It is sufficient, most of the 
time, to behave in accord with principles that we know are generally in line with the 
CI. In fact, Kant himself develops an account of ethical virtue – it is the subject of the 
second half of his later ethical work, the Metaphysics of Morals. So in Kant’s ethical 
system, the virtues are not the primary tool for theorizing, or the primary element 
that comes up for evaluation (it is actions that are primary objects of evaluation, for 
Kant). Still, they have a role to play. 
 Or consider another analogy, which is less directly connected with virtue 
theory, but where it is even more obvious that strictly superfluous units still have a 
role to play. In teaching and using formal logic, it is typical to use five logical 
connectives: AND, OR, IF-THEN, NOT, and IF AND ONLY IF. Now strictly speaking, 
we do not need five connectives; we can make do with just one. But if we employ 
just one logical connective, the logical formulae become so impenetrable, and so 
distant from the way that statements are expressed in a natural language, that it is 
very useful to have at least four connectives, even though some of them are strictly 
superfluous. 
 So I accept that, on the way that I am setting things up, virtues of 
argumentation are superfluous, because the primarily good is particular instances of 
argumentation, where good argumentation succeeds in establishing justification for 
PATRICK BONDY 
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thinking that the conclusion is true. But it does not follow that the virtues have no 
useful role to play. 
 
6. QUESTIONS WE CAN ADDRESS WITH THE VIRTUE APPROACH 
 
Now I want to attempt to address some questions in the theory of argument via the 
virtue approach to argumentation. The idea is to illustrate the usefulness of thinking 
in terms of the virtues. 
 My initial idea was to address the question: does successful resolution of a 
disagreement via argumentation require a change in the beliefs of (at least one of) 
the parties to the argumentative exchange, or does it only require a change in their 
commitments?5 The approach to that question would be to consider what the 
virtuous arguer would do, or else to consider whether the habit or disposition of 
changing one’s beliefs or one’s commitments best promotes the goal of 
argumentation. 
 But it turns out that this question, while interesting, is not an appropriate 
one for approaching with the virtues of argumentation in mind. Recall that in trying 
to get an account of the virtues of argumentation going, I am taking virtue 
epistemology as a guide. And the goal of argumentation, from an epistemic point of 
view, is to arrive at true beliefs via argumentation – or, better, it is to arrive at 
justified belief that the conclusion of an argument is true. So it follows 
straightforwardly from the epistemic approach to argumentation that merely 
changing one’s commitments is insufficient as a response to an argument; in a 
successful argumentative exchange, at least one party will end up with a change in 
belief. 
 A better topic to approach with virtues of argumentation in our toolkit would 
be the fallacies. Many of the traditional fallacies are really only misuses of types of 
arguments that can have perfectly legitimate uses. The ad hominem fallacy, for 
instance, can be understood as a misuse of the ethotic argument: the type of 
argument where an arguer’s character is in question. (See Hitchcock, 2007 for the 
case that there is in fact no real ad hominem fallacy.) Ethotic arguments have 
perfectly legitimate uses: given that an arguer’s (perceived) character can be very 
influential, say, when it comes to whether an audience will accept the premises that 
the arguer offers, it is often important to be able to show (for example) that the 
arguer has appropriate credentials, or perhaps that he is known for inventing 
statistics on the fly. The ad hominem is only a misuse of that kind of argument, when 
the arguer’s credibility is not a potential issue for the acceptability of any of the 
moves in the argument. Aberdein (2010, p. 171) argues that the virtue approach can 
help us account for the difference between good and bad ethotic arguments: the 
good ones draw attention to argumentative virtues and vices; the bad ones attack an 
arguer for her non-argumentational vices, or for behaviour that is not in fact vicious. 
 Similarly, other fallacies might be profitably approached with virtues in 
mind, such as the tu quoque. The tu quoque occurs when one person argues against 
                                                 
5 There is a good treatment of this question in Godden (2010). 
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a type of action, and someone objects, “but you don’t follow your own advice – you 
do it too!” This type of argument can have legitimate uses – for example, if the fact 
that an arguer does not follow her own advice is evidence that she does not believe 
her own advice, then that can be a reason to reject her argument. But sometimes an 
arguer will not follow her own advice, even though she does believe it: imagine a 
doctor who smokes, and advises a patient to quit smoking, but continues to smoke 
herself. This doctor can still give a perfectly good argument for quitting smoking, 
which the patient ought to accept, even though the doctor doesn’t follow her own 
advice. The doctor might continue smoking because she is addicted, but know 
perfectly well that smoking is bad for your health. 
 So there can be good and bad uses of tu quoque arguments. All tu quoque 
arguments are attempts to highlight vicious argumentation, where an arguer is 
criticizing a type of action, but where she does not believe premises of her own 
argument, as evidenced by her failure to follow her own advice. Good tu quoque 
arguments do just that: they identify vicious argumentation, where an arguer’s 
failure to follow her own advice is evidence that she doesn’t believe her own 
argument. Bad tu quoque arguments fail to do that: they attempt to identify 
argumentative vice, but where the argumentation is in fact virtuous. They either 
identify failures to follow one’s own advice, where that failure is not evidence that 
the arguer does not believe her own argument; or else they claim that the arguer 
does not believe her own argument, on the basis of her failure to follow her own 
advice, but the arguer does not in fact fail to follow her own advice. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
To sum up: in this paper, I have taken the epistemic approach to the theory of 
argument for granted. On that basis, I have explored the notion of a virtue of 
argumentation, taking the epistemic virtues as my guide. The criterion of virtues of 
argumentation, I claimed, is responsible engagement in argumentation, where 
responsible engagement involves accepting the conclusion of an argument on the 
basis of the reasons offered when (and only when) the reasons offered are good 
ones for thinking that the conclusion is true. 
 I have argued, however, that we should take particular arguments as the 
basic units that come up for evaluation as good or bad, while agents and their 
virtues are secondary units of evaluation. Virtues are virtues because they promote 
good argumentation; good argumentation is not good because the arguers are 
virtuous. Nevertheless, there is useful work to be done in terms of the virtues of 
argumentation. 
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